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This Article will discuss the decisions of the Inter-American Court, comparing them with U.S.
judicial decisions involving “state action” and private conduct. It will point out the evolution in in-
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guarantees for individual rights that are lacking in U.S. constitutional law.
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INTRODUCTION
Between mid-1988 and early 1989, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (the "Court") decided its first three
contentious cases.' The cases were submitted to the Court by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the "Com-
mission"), based on individual petitions filed by the families of
disappeared persons against the government of Honduras. In
the cases of Angel Manfredo Velisquez Rodriguez ("Veldsquez
Rodriguez") and Saul Godinez Cruz ("Godinez Cruz"), the Court
unanimously found that Honduras had violated the rights of
personal liberty, humane treatment, and life guaranteed by the
American Convention on Human Rights (the "American Con-
vention" or the "Convention"). 2 As a result, the Court de-
cided that Honduras must pay fair compensation to the vic-
tims' next-of-kin.3 In the case of Fairen Garbi and Solis Cor-
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., 1967, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley;J.D., 1970, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
1. See Velisquez Rodriguez Case, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS [INTER-AM. CT. H.R.], OAS/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13
(1988); Godinez Cruz Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS ANDJUDGMENTS (ser. C)
No. 5 (1989); Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS
AND JUDGMENTS (ser. C) No. 6 (1989). For a discussion of the procedural aspects of
the Court's work, see Shelton, Judicial Review of State Action by International Courts, 12
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 361 (1989).
2. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 75-76, 194; Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 159-60, 203. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, OEA/ser. K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65 rev. 1, corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970) [hereinafter American Convention]. Nineteen states, members of the Organi-
zation of American States, have ratified the Convention: Argentina, Barbados, Bo-
livia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. See ORG. OF AM. STATES HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING
TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/ser. L./V./II.65, doc. 6
(1985) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. The United States is a signatory, but not a state
party. See President's Message to the Senate Transmitting Human Rights Treaties,
PUB. PAPERS, Feb. 23, 1978, at 395.
3. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 76, 194(5); Godinez Cruz, INTER-
2 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 13:1
rales ("Fairen Garbi"), the Court unanimously held that the
evidence failed to establish Honduran responsibility for the
disappearances.4
In interpreting and applying the American Convention,
the Court drew upon its prior advisory opinions as well as deci-
sions of other international tribunals5 and organizations. 6 It
also applied concepts and terminology from the traditional law
of state responsibility for injury to aliens.7
The Court's opinions detail three distinct obligations of
States Parties to the Convention: (1) abstention from violating
guaranteed human rights; (2) prevention of violations by state
and non-state actors; and (3) investigation and punishment of
both state and private human rights infringements. 8 These ob-
ligations derive from the text of article 1 of the Convention,
which binds states parties "to respect" the rights guaranteed
by the Convention and "to ensure" to all persons their full and
free exercise. 9
AM. CT. H.R. at 160, 203(5). In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Court did not fix the
amount of damages in its judgment because the parties submitted no evidence on the
issue. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R., at 75, 190. Instead, it decided that
Honduras and the Commission should agree on the amount of damages and present
their agreement to the Court for approval. Id. $ 191. Failing agreement, the Court
retained jurisdiction to decide the issue. Id. at 76, 194(6). The parties failed to
reach agreement and onJuly 21, 1989, the Court awarded damages totalling one and
a half million lempiras to the family, spouse, and children of Velasquez Rodriguez.
INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (Press Release) July 21, 1989. In Godinez Cruz, the Court retained
jurisdiction to award damages. Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 160, 203(6).
The amount was subsequently set at one million three hundred thousand lempiras.
INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (Press Release) July 21, 1989.
4. Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 40, 1 163(2).
5. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 60, 127 (citing Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. I (Judgment of Apr. 9); Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment ofJune 27)). The
Court would have applied the concepts of article 1 (1) of the Convention in any event
under general principles of law. See Veldsquez Rodriquez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 69,
163 (citing The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10; The Handyside Case, 24
EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A) (1976)).
6. The Court makes particular use of the work of the United Nations and the
Organization of American States (the "OAS") bodies in combatting disappearances.
Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 66-67, 1 151-53.
7. For example, in Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Court held that the American Conven-
tion imposes the requirement of "due diligence" upon states to prevent human
rights violations. Id. at 71, 172. For a further discussion of due diligence, see infra
notes 121-37 and accompanying text.
8. See Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 151, 155-56, 11 164, 174-77.
9. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(1) at 1, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 675.
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The scope of the Convention's protection may be com-
pared to the general lack of governmental responsibility under
the U.S. Constitution for failure to act with respect to violence
committed by private actors. The contrast is most pronounced
in the recent Supreme Court decision of DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services.' Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a majority of six, held that the due process clause
"forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or
property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot
fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the
State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm
through other means.""
This Article will discuss the decisions of the Inter-Ameri-
can Court, comparing them with U.S. judicial decisions involv-
ing "state action" and private conduct. It will point out the
evolution in international law from restraints on the exercise of
state power, with limited affirmative duties for the protection
of aliens, to the more generalized obligation of ensuring re-
spect for human rights. This Article concludes that the Ameri-
can Convention provides guarantees for individual rights that
are lacking in U.S. constitutional law.
I. INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS
Since 1948, the Inter-American system of the Organiza-
tion of American States (the "OAS") has developed ambitious
and effective mechanisms for promoting and protecting human
rights. The legal documents of the system' 2 recognize civil,
10. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
11. Id. at 1003.
12. See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2416, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 721 U.N.T.S. 326 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. The Inter-American
system has two legal bases, one of which is the OAS Charter. Id. The other is the
American Convention. See supra note 2. In addition, certain subsidiary documents
are legally binding. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948)
[hereinafter American Declaration], reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 17-25;
Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1979) [hereinafter
Commission Statute], reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 103-13; Regulations of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1980, modified 1985) [hereinafter
Commission Regulations], reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2 at 115-42; Statute of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979) [hereinafter Court Statute], re-
printed in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 143-54; Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights (1980) [hereinafter Court Rules], reprinted in HANDBOOK,
1989-1990]
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political, economic, social, and cultural rights.' 3 The OAS es-
tablished the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights' 4
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.' 5 The Com-
mission may review complaints from individuals and groups or
may itself initiate proceedings concerning human rights viola-
tions by any OAS Member State. 6 The Commission may also
undertake country-wide studies of human rights practices and
supra note 2, at 155-74. On the legal status of the American Declaration, see Inter-
pretation of American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the Frame-
work of article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion
No. OC-10/89, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (July 14, 1989); Buergenthal, The Revised OAS
Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 833-36 (1975).
13. See American Declaration, supra note 12, arts. I-XXVIII, reprinted in HAND-
BOOK, supra note 2, at 20-24; American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3-26, at 2-9,
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 676-83.
14. See OAS Charter, supra note 12, arts. 51(e), 112, 150, 21 U.S.T. at 673-74,
691, 701, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 at 67-68, 85, 95, 721 U.N.T.S. at 342, 364-66, 376;
American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 33-51, at 11-15, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 685-
89. The OAS General Assembly elects the seven members of the Commission to
serve in their individual capacities for a term of four years. Commission Regulations,
supra note 12, art. 1(3); American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 36-37, at 11, re-
printed in 9 I.L.M. at 685. The Commission represents all Member States of the OAS
as both an organ of the OAS and of the Convention. OAS Charter, supra note 12, art.
112, 21 U.S.T. at 691, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 at 85, 721 U.N.T.S. at 364-66. The Com-
mission functions to promote the observance and protection of human rights. It also
serves as a consultative organ of the OAS in human rights matters. See id.; see also
American Convention, supra note 2, art. 41, at 12, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 686;
Shelton, Implementation Procedures of the American Convention on Human Rights, 26 GER.
Y.B. INT'L L. 238, 241 (1983).
15. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 33, at 11, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at
685. The Court consists of seven judges nominated from among nationals of the
member states of the OAS. Id. art. 52, at 16, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 690. Judges are
elected to the Court in an individual capacity by a vote of the states parties to the
Convention. Id. The Judges of the Court are to be "of the highest moral authority,
... of recognized competence in the field of human rights, . . . [and to] possess the
qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial functions" in the state
of nationality or of the state that nominates them. Id. The judges are elected for a
term of six years and "may be re-elected only once." Id. art. 54, at 16, reprinted in 9
I.L.M. at 690; see Court Statute, supra note 12, arts. 4-7, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra,
note 2, at 144-46; Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 231 (1982).
16. See American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 44-45, at 13, reprinted in 9 1.LM.
at 687. The Inter-American system is unique in making the right of individual peti-
tion automatic and inter-state proceedings optional. Id.; see Commission Statute,
supra note 12, arts. 18-20, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 109-11; Commission
Regulations, supra note 12, art. 26, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 125; Norris,
The Individual Petition Procedure of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human
Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 117 (H. Hannum ed.
1986); Norris, Bringing Human Rights Petitions Before the Inter-American Commission, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 733, 738 (1980).
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make on-site investigations.1 7
The Court may hear cases between states parties to the
Convention or against a state at the request of the Commission
if the state involved has accepted the Court's jurisdiction.' 8
The Court may award damages and take provisional measures
when necessary. 19
II. THE HONDURAN CASES
A., Facts
The facts of Veldsquez Rodriguez, Godinez Cruz, and Fairen
Garbi are similar. The first case concerned Angel Manfredo
Velisquez Rodriguez, a student at the National Autonomous
University of Honduras who disappeared on September 12,
1981.20 He was allegedly kidnapped and detained without a
warrant for his arrest by members of the National Office of In-
vestigations (the "DNI") and of the Armed Forces of Hondu-
ras. ' During his detention he was taken to various locations
17. See Commission Statute, supra note 12, arts. 18(c), 18(g), reprinted in HAND-
BOOK, supra note 2, at 109-10; Commission Regulations, supra note 12, arts. 44, 62,
reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 131, 137-38. For a list of country reports
published by the Commission, see Shelton,Judicial Review of State Action by International
Courts, 12 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 361, 365 n.12 (1989).
18. See American Convention, supra note 2, arts. 61(1), 62(3), at 17-18, reprinted
in 9 I.L.M. at 691-92. The Court also has the most extensive advisory jurisdiction of
any international tribunal. Compare the American Convention, supra note 2, with the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J. Stat.) June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993. In the American Convention, both states and other bodies
within the OAS and even states who have not ratified the Convention can call upon
the Court's advisory jurisdiction. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 64 at
18, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at 692. However, the International Court ofJustice is limited
to acting upon requests formally presented by the United Nations; individual states
cannot request an advisory opinion from the Court. See I.C.J. Stat., art. 65, 59 Stat. at
1063, T.S. No. 993 at 33. The European Convention initially provided for no advi-
sory jurisdiction. However, article 1 of Protocol 2 added a limited advisory jurisdic-
tion at the request of the Committee of Ministeries. See Protocol No. 2 to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 6,
1963, art. 1, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 26 (Council of
Europe, 1979); see also Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human
Rights Court, 79 AM.J. INT'L L. 1 (1985).
19. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 63, at 18, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at
692.
20. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 36, 3, OAS/ser. L./V./
111. 19, doc. 13 (1988).
21. Id.
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where he was interrogated and tortured.22
The second case questioned the December 1981 disap-
pearances of Francicso Fairen Garbi and Yolanda Solis Cor-
rales.23 Their families petitioned the Commission one month
after the two Costa Rican nationals were last seen. The peti-
tion alleged that they had been traveling together by car en
route to Mexico to visit relatives.24 When they failed to return
to Costa Rica as planned, the families inquired after them at
the Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Guatemalan Embassies. The
Nicaraguan Embassy said that the two had left Nicaragua for
Honduras on December 11, 1981.25 The Guatemalan Embassy
reported they had not entered Guatemala.2 6 After some incon-
sistent statements, Honduras replied that both Fairen Garbi
and Solis Corrales had left Honduras for Guatemala on De-
cember 12.27 Guatemala then admitted this, saying that the
pair had continued on to El Salvador.2 s El Salvador denied
that they had entered the country.29
The third case commenced one year after the opening of
the Veldsquez Rodriguez case, when the Commission received the
Godinez Cruz petition. Saul Godinez Cruz, a schoolteacher, dis-
appeared on July 22, 1982 on his way to work. ° The petition
alleged that an eyewitness saw a man in military uniform and
two individuals in plain clothes arrest someone resembling
Godinez, and place him and his motorcycle in a larger vehi-
cle."' Godinez's house had been under surveillance prior to
his disappearance.3 2
22. Id.
23. Case 7951, 1984-1985 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS [INTER-AM. C.H.R.] 84, OEA/ser. L./V./II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1
(1985) (Resolution 16/84, Oct. 4, 1984).
24. Id. at 85.
25. Id.
26. Id. The government of Guatemala subsequently indicated that the two had
entered Guatemala from Honduras on December 12, 1981 and departed for El Salva-
dor on December. 14, 1981. Id. at 90.
27. Id. at 87. Initially, Honduras claimed that only Solis Corrales had entered
the country. Id. at 101-02.
28. Id. at 102.
29. Id. at 103.
30. Godinez Cruz Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 85, 86,
3 (ser. C) No. 5 (1989).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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In accordance with its procedures, the Commission trans-
mitted the relevant parts, of the three petitions to the Hondu-
ran government for its response. 33 In Fairen Garbi, the govern-
ment replied to Commission inquiries and submitted evidence
denying its involvement.3 4 After evaluating the evidence, the
Commission held Honduras responsible for the disappear-
ances.3 5 In the other two cases, the Commission repeatedly
and unsuccessfully sought to acquire information from the
Honduran government. Receiving no reply, the Commission
applied article 42 of its regulations and presumed the truth of
the allegations contained in the petition. 6
Subsequently, the government requested reconsideration
of the cases, claiming that domestic remedies had not been ex-
hausted. 7 The Commission requested further information, fi-
nally concluding proceedings on April 18, 1986, nearly five
years after the Veldsquez Rodriguez petition was filed. In its reso-
lution of Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Commission found that the ev-
idence showed the youth to be missing and that Honduras
"ha[d] not offered convincing proof that would allow the Com-
mission to determine that the allegations [were] not true. ' 38
Concerning Godinez Cruz, the Commission decided that the re-
quest for reconsideration was unfounded and "lack[ed] infor-
mation other than that already examined by the Commis-
33. Commission Regulations, supra note 12, art. 34(c), reprinted in HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, at 127-28.
34. Case 7951, 1984-1985 INTER-AM. C.H.R. 84, 87-88, OEA/ser. L./V./II. 66,
doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985) (Resolution 16/84, Oct. 4, 1984).
35. Id. at 103.
36. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 36, 4, OAS/ser. L./V./
111.19, doc. 13 (1988); Godinez Cruz Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDG-
MENTS 85, 87, 4 (ser. C) No. 5 (1989). Article 42 states:
The facts reported in the petition whose pertinent parts have been transmit-
ted to the government of the State in reference shall be presumed to be true
if, during the maximum period set by the Commission under the provisions
of Article 34 paragraph 5, the government has not provided the pertinent
information, as long as other evidence does not lead to a different conclu-
sion.
Commission Regulations, supra note 12, art. 42, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2,
at 131.
37. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 36, 5; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 87, 5. The Commission Regulations require that domestic remedies be
.exhausted before a petition may be brought before the Commission. See Commission
Regulations, supra note 12, art. 37(1), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 129.
38. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 37, 10.
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sion. ' 39 Finally, in Fairen Garbi, the Commission reaffirmed a
1984 decision finding Honduras responsible for the disappear-
ances 40
The Commission referred all three cases to the Court in
resolutions adopted April 18, 1986.4 1 The Honduran govern-
ment responded by entering preliminary objections to the
Court's jurisdiction.4 2 The Court heard arguments on the ob-
jections on June 15 and 16, 1987." On June 26, the Court
unanimously rejected all Honduran objections except those re-
lating to the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies, which
were joined to the merits of the cases.4 4
Hearings on the merits took place between September 30
and October 7, 1987. 45 The Court heard arguments by agents
for the Commission and the government. The Commission
called a series of witnesses for three purposes. The first pur-
pose was to have a group testify in all three cases about the
39. Case 8097, 1985-1986 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS [INTER-AM. C.H.R.] 49, 50, OEA/ser. L./V./II.68, doc. 8 rev. 1
(1986) (Resolution No. 24/86, Apr. 18).
40. Case 7951, 1985-1986 INTER-AM. C.H.R. 47, 49, OEA/ser. L./V./II.68, doc.
8 rev. 1 (1986) (Resolution No. 23/86, Apr. 18). According to this resolution, the
Commission's earlier decision was based upon the presumed truth of the facts al-
leged, pursuant to article 42 of the Commission's Regulations. However, the earlier
resolution, 16/84 of October 4, 1984, makes no reference to article 42 and appears
instead to constitute a decision on the merits, taking into account the replies of Hon-
duras. See Case 7951, 1984-1985 INTER-AM. C.H.R. 84, 101-03, OEA/ser. L./V./
11.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985).
4 1. Case 7920, 1985-1986 INTER-AM. C.H.R. 40, 47, OEA/ser. L./V./II.68, doc.
8 rev. 1 (1986) (Resolution No. 22/86); Case 7951, 1985-1986 INTER-AM. C.H.R. 47,
49, OEA/ser. L./V./II.68, doc. 8 rev. 1 (1986) (Resolution No. 23/86); Case 8097,
1985-1986 INTER-AM. C.H.R. 49, 51, OEA/ser. L./V./II.68, doc. 8 rev. 1 (1986)
(Resolution No. 24/86).
42. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 38, 16, OAS/ser. L./
V./111.19, doc. 13 (1988); Godinez Cruz Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND
JUDGMENTS 85, 90, 18 (ser. C) No. 5 (1989); Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case,
INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 1, 5, 1 15 (ser. C) No. 6 (1989).
43. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 39, 22 (June 15); Godinez Cruz,
INTER-AM CT. H.R- at 91, 24 (June 16); Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 6, 21
(June 16).
44. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 55, 96, OEA/ser. L./V./
111.17, doc. 13 (1987) (Preliminary Objections); Godinez Cruz Case, INTER-AM. CT.
H.R. 81, 101, 98, OEA/ser. L./V./III.17, doc. 13 (1987) (Preliminary Objections);
Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 57, 78, 95, OEA/ser. L./
V./III.17, doc. 13 (1987) (Preliminary Objections).
45. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 40, 28; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 94, 30; Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 7, 28.
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general situation in Honduras between 1981 and 1984 con-
cerning disappearances and governmental complicity. 46 The
second purpose was to have a group testify in all three cases
about the existence of effective domestic remedies during this
period.47 Finally, the Commission called different sets of wit-
nesses to testify on the specific facts relating to each of the dis-
appeared.48
While the cases were pending, the Court issued two in-
terim orders. Both contained protective measures requested
by the Commission as a result of threats made against certain
witnesses and the murders of others.49
The Court issued its judgment on the merits in Veldsquez
Rodriguez on July 29, 1988,50 in Godinez Cruz on January 20,
1989, 5" and in Fairen Garbi on March 15, 1989.52 In each case,
the Court concluded that domestic remedies could not be ex-
46. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 41, 28(c); Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 94-95, 30(c); Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 8, 30(c).
47. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 41, 28(d); Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 95, 30(d); Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 8, 30(d).
48. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 41, 28(e); Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 95, 30(e); Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 8, 30(e).
49. The January 15 order, referring to attacks on witnesses as "savage, primi-
tive, inhuman and reprehensible," demanded that the Honduran government
adopt, without delay, such measures as are necessary to prevent further in-
fringements on the basic rights of those who have appeared or have been
summoned to do so before this Court . . . in strict compliance with the
obligation of respect for and observance of human rights, under the terms
of Article 1(1) of the Convention.
Velisquez Rodriguez, Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales, and Godinez Cruz Cases, IN-
TER-AM. CT. H.R. 25, 26, OEA/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988) (Interim Protection
Order ofJan. 15). This same order required the government to investigate and pun-
ish the threats against and murders of witnesses. Id.
On January 18, 1988, following a public hearing, the Court decided on further
measures, requiring the Honduran government report to the Court the specific steps
taken to protect witnesses and investigate crimes against them. The Court included a
demand for medical and forensic reports on those witnesses who had been killed.
Velisquez Rodriguez, Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales, and Godinez Cruz Cases, IN-
TER-AM. CT. H.R. 27, 28, OEA/ser. L./V./III.19, doc. 13 (1988) (Interim Protection
Order of Jan. 19). The government submitted autopsy and forensic reports to the
Court within two weeks. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 45-46, 46. Fur-
ther documentation, including autopsy and ballistic reports, was submitted by the
government the following month. Id. at 46-47, 49.
50. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 35.
51. Godinez Cruz Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 85 (ser.
C) No. 5 (1989).
52. Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND
JUDGMENTS I (ser. C) No. 6 (1989).
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hausted because existing remedies in Honduras during the pe-
riod in question were ineffective.53 It found that from 1981 to
1984 between 100 and 150 persons disappeared in Honduras
under similar circumstances.54 Concerning kidnappings, the
Court found "[i]t was public and notorious knowledge in Hon-
duras that the kidnappings were carried out by military person-
nel or the police, or persons acting under their orders. ' 55
The Court determined that both Velisquez Rodriguez and
Godinez Cruz were kidnapped under circumstances falling
within the systematic practice of disappearances, 56 that per-
sons connected with the army or under its direction carried out
the kidnappings,57 and that there was no evidence that either
man had disappeared to join subversive groups.58
Based on these findings, the Court held Honduras respon-
sible for the disappearances. Moreover, the State was respon-
sible even if the disappearances were not carried out by agents
who acted under cover of public authority, because the State's
apparatus failed to act to prevent the disappearances or to
punish those responsible. 59 Therefore, because Honduran of-
ficials either carried out or acquiesced in the kidnappings, the
Court concluded that the government "failed to guarantee the
human rights affected by" disappearances.6 °
In Fairen Garbi, the Court did not hold Honduras responsi-
ble because the evidence failed to establish where the two indi-
viduals had disappeared. 6' The Court found that they left Nic-
aragua on December 1 1 and entered Guatemala on December
53. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 52, 4 80-81; Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. 85, 116, 87-88; Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 1, 24-25, 96-102.
54. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 63, 147(a); Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 137, 153(a); Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 35, 153(a).
55. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 64, 147(c); Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 137, 153(c); Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 36, 153(c).
56. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 65, 147(g); Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 140, 154(b).
57. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 65, 147(0; Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 136-37, 153(c).
58. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 65, 147(h); Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 141, 154(b) (v)-(vi).
59. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 73, 182; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 156, 9 192.
60. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 66, 148; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 142, 156.
61. Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECiSIONS AND
JUDGMENTS 1, 38-39, 157-60 (ser. C) No. 6 (1989).
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12.62 After this time, there was no clear proof of their move-
ments. Under these circumstances, the Court, disagreeing
with the conclusions of the Commission, found insufficient
proof of Honduran responsibility.
63
B. Analysis
The issues and principles in all three cases centered on
state responsibility for human rights violations. Petitioners al-
leged violations of articles 4, 5, and 7 of the Convention.64
The Court found that infringements of the rights contained in
these provisions inevitably involve violation of Convention ar-
ticle 1, which sets out the general obligations of states and con-
tains the generic basis of liability. 65 The Court viewed article 1
as establishing the conditions under which a particular act,
which violates one of the rights recognized by the Convention,
can be imputed to a state party, thereby establishing its inter-
national responsibility.66
Article 1(1) of the Convention provides:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect
the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to
all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full ex-
ercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimina-
tion for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, polit-
ical or other opinion, national or social origin, economic
status, birth, or any other social condition.67
62. Id. at 28-30, 1 116, 117, 124(a), 124(c). It is noteworthy that the Court
appointed a handwriting expert to analyze Fairen Garbi's signature on the border-
crossing documents submitted by the government in the case. Id. at 12, 32, 91 45,
138.
63. Id. at 40, 1 163(2).
64. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 68, 159; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. 85, 148, 168; Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 2, 2. Article 4 guaran-
tees the right to life; article 5 protects the right to humane treatment, including the
right to physical, mental, and moral integrity; article 7 ensures the right to personal
liberty and security. American Convention, supra note 2, at 2-4, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at
676-78.
65. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 68-69, 160, 162; Godinez Cruz,
INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 148, $$ 169, 171; Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 39,
1 161.
66. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 68-69, 1 160, 162; Godinez Cruz,
INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 148, $1 169, 171; Fairen Garbi, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 39,
1 161.
67. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(1), at 1, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. at
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According to the Court, article 1 is implicated in every
claim alleging a violation of one of the protected rights.6 8 "In
effect, that article charges the states parties with the fundamen-
tal duty to respect and guarantee the rights recognized in the
Convention. '69 Thus, any human rights violation that can be
attributed to the act or omission of any state agency, according
to international law principles, constitutes an act imputable to
the state. 70
As interpreted by the Court, article 1(1) contains several
separate duties. First, a state shall respect the rights and free-
doms recognized by the Convention. This "must necessarily
comprise the concept of the restriction of the exercise of state
power."' 7' The existence of a legal system designed to permit
exercise of human rights does not alone ensure compliance
with a state's obligations, because rights may be violated in
spite of legal protections. Thus, the Court declares, whenever
a state organ, official, or public entity violates a protected
right, this constitutes a failure of the duty to respect the rights
and freedoms set forth in the Convention because public
68. Thus, even if the Commission does not allege a violation of article 1(1) of
the Convention, the Court may nevertheless apply its provisions.
The precept contained therein constitutes the generic basis of the protec-
tion of the rights recognized by the Convention and would be applicable, in
any case, by virtue of a general principle of law, Jura novit curia, on which
international jurisprudence has repeatedly relied and under which a court
has the power and the duty to apply the juridical provisions relevant to a
proceeding, even when the parties do not expressly invoke them.
Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 69, 163; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM. CT. H.R.
at 148-49, 172 (emphasis in orginal). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
approach may be contrasted with the European Court's approach, which does not
recognize that article 1 of the European Convention is capable of independent viola-
tion. The European Convention states in part that "the High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
Section 1 of this Convention." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224. See Ireland v. U.K., 25 EUR.
CT. H.R. 1, 90-91, 239 (ser. A) (1978).
69. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 69, 164; Godinez Cruz; INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 149, 173.
70. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 69, 164; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM..
CT. H.R. at 149, 173.
71. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 69-70, 165; Godinez Cruz, INTER-
AM. CT. H.R. at 149-50, 174. Both cases quote from The Word "Laws" in article
30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion No.- OC-6/86,
INTER-AM. CT. H.R. JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS I, 29, 21 (ser. A) No. 6 (1986).
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power is used to infringe the rights recognized.72 In general,
then, a state is responsible for the acts and omissions of its
agents undertaken in their official capacity, even if they are act-
ing outside the scope of their authority or in violation of inter-
nal law.73 Intent or motivation is irrelevant.7 4
Second, the states must "ensure" the free and full exercise
of the rights recognized by the Convention. This obligation
requires states "to organize the governmental apparatus and,
in general, all the structures through which public power is ex-
ercised, so that they are capable ofjuridically ensuring the free
and full enjoyment of human rights."75 This implies, first, that
states must prevent violations of the rights recognized by the
Convention. 76 In addition, the state must attempt to investi-
gate and punish violations of human rights, restore the right
violated, and provide compensation as warranted for damages
resulting from the violation.77
• The existence of affirmative duties to prevent and to rem-
edy human rights violations implies, as a consequence, that
state responsibility extends to omissions by state actors. The
Court cites the example of a state that is not directly repon-
sible for a human rights violation because the act is that of a
private person, but that becomes responsible because of "the
lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to
72. VeldsquezRodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 70, 169; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 85, 151, 178 (ser. C) No. 5 (1989).
73. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 70, 170; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 151, $ 179.
74. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 71, 9 173; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 152,, 183.
75. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 70, 166; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 150, 175. Compare the obligations of states parties to the European
Convention on Human Rights, which
does not merely oblige the higher authorities of the Contracting States to
respect for their own part the rights and freedomsit embodies; ... the Con-
vention also has the consequence that, in order to secure the enjoyment of
those rights and freedoms, those authorities must prevent or remedy any
breach at subordinate levels.
Ireland v. U.K., 25 EUR. CT. H.R. 1, 9.1, 239 (ser..A) (1978).
76. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 70, 9 166; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 150, 9 175.
77. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 70, 9 166; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 150, 1 175.
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it as required by the Convention. ' 78 In addition, the Court de-
clares that where human rights violations committed by private
parties are not seriously investigated, "those parties are aided
in a sense by the government, thereby making the State re-
sponsible on the international plane." 79
The Court concludes that the state is liable for disappear-
ances such as those of Velfisquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz,
which were found to be "carried out by [agents] who acted
under cover of public authority."80 Significantly, the Court
adds that even if state complicity were not proven, the failure
of the State "to act, which is clearly proven, is a failure on the
part of Honduras to fulfill the duties it assumed under Article
1(1) of the Convention' ' s8 to ensure the full and free exercise
of human rights.
In sum, under article 1,
[t]he State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to pre-
vent human rights violations and to use the means at its dis-
posal to carry out a serious investigation of violations com-
mitted within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible,
to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the
victim adequate compensation.8 2
III. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLA TIONS
The Court acknowledges that article 1 does not impose
liability for all human rights violations, only for those that can
be attributed to the action or omission of any public authority
78. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 71, 172; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 152, 182.
79. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 72, 177; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 154, 188.
80. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 73, 182; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 156, 192.
81. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 73, 182; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 156, 192. The Court noted that the illegality of these acts under Hon-
duran law and the fact that not all levels of the Government were aware of them are
irrelevant for establishing state responsibility, as is the question of whether the acts
were the result of official orders. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 73, 183;
Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 156, 193.
82. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 71, 174; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 152, 184.
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under the rules of international law.83 "[I]n principle, any vio-
lation of [Convention-guaranteed rights] carried out by an act
of public authority or by persons who use their position of au-
thority is imputable to the State."8 4 In addition, although the
state may not bear initial responsibility for acts of private vio-
lence, responsibility may be imputed because of the "lack of
due diligence ' 85 to prevent or remedy violations committed
by non-state actors.
In this analysis, the Court echoes the traditional law of
state responsibility for injury to aliens. Prior to the establish-
ment of international systems for the protection of human
rights at the end of World War II, international law recognized
a state's right to bring a claim against another state because of
breaches of international law causing injury to the person or
property of its nationals.8 6 In the Mavrommatis Palestine Conces-
sions, the Permanent Court of International Justice states that
'[i]t is an elementary principle of international law that a State
is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary
to international law committed by another State, from whom
they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordi-
nary channels." 87
Although international law during this period imposed an
obligation on states to protect foreign nationals and to treat
them according to recognized minimum standards, 88 in gen-
83. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 69, 164; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. 85, 149, 173.
84. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 71, 172; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 152, 181.
85. Veldsquez Rodriguez, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. at 71, 172; Godinez Cruz, INTER-AM.
CT. H.R. at 152, 182.
86. The law of responsibility for injury to aliens was largely developed by inter-
national claims practice over the past 100 years, notably the United States-Mexico
General Claims' Convention of 1923. Claims Convention, Sept. 8, 1923, United
States-Mexico, 43 Stat. 1730, T.S. No. 678. For claims involving the United States,
see 6 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 970-1063, at 605-1037 (1906); 5
G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 520-46, at 471-851 (1943); 8 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw §§ 1-39, at 697-1291 (1967). For the ear-
lier legal history of state responsibility, see L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-137 (1973). See generally F.V. GARCIA-
AMADOR, L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPON-
SIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1974) [hereinafter F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR].
87. The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 2, 6, 12 (Aug. 30).
88. See generally A. ROTH, THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AP-
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eral it imposed no similar obligation regarding the treatment
of a state's own nationals. 89 The great innovation of interna-
tional human rights law has been to extend the protections for-
merly afforded aliens, and to some extent, religious minori-
ties, 90 to all individuals. 9'
Today, as the Honduran cases make clear, one of the in-
ternational obligations imposed upon states by treaty and cus-
tom is to "respect and ensure" internationally recognized
human rights. 92 Because of this duty, a state's failure to act to
prevent or remedy human rights violations committed by pri-
vate entities, such as death squads, may give rise to liability in
circumstances where, in earlier times, liability was found only
under the law of state responsibility for injury to aliens.
A. Acts and Omissions
Acts contrary to international law involve a breach or non-
performance of an international obligation.9" Breach includes
both "acts" and "omissions" according to the type of conduct
PLIED TO ALIENS (1949); A. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES
FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1938).
89. See T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 2-3
(1988); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE §§ 288-92, at 362-69 (2d
ed. 1912).
90. See e.g., L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 86, at 137-211.
91. See T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 89, at 14-16; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, part VII introductory note, at 144-47 (1987) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD)]. The Restatement notes that'
[i]nternational law has long held states responsible for "denials of justice"
and certain other injuries to nationals of other states. Increaisingly, interna-
tional human rights agreements have created obligations and responsibili-
ties for states in respect of all individuals subject to their jurisdiction, includ-
ing their own nationals, and a customary international law of human rights
has developed and has continued to grow.
Id.; F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note'86, at 5. On the general duty to protect, see
Ramcharan, The Concept of Protection in the International Law of Human Rights, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 593 (Y. Dinstein, 1989).
92. See Velisquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 69-70, 165-66,
OAS/ser. L./V./I 11.19, doc. 13 (1988); Godinez Cruz Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DE-
CISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 85, 149-50, 174-75 (ser. C) No. 5 (1989); Fairen Garbi
and Solis Corrales Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND JUDGMENTS 1, 39, 161
(ser. C) No. 6 (1989).
93. State responsibility rests on the principle that breach of international law is a
wrong for which there is a duty to make reparation. See 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A
MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (4th ed. 1960); see also The Factory at Chorzt6w
(Claim for Indemnity) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13 (Sept. 13). "Any
breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation." Id. at 29.
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covered by the rule in question because both are included in
the concept of non-performance of an international obliga-
tion.
94
International practice has long made clear that both acts
and omissions may give rise to international liability, depend-
ing on the duty imposed under international law.95 In fact, one
United Nations report noted that "the cases in which the inter-
national responsibility of a State has been invoked on the basis
of an omission are perhaps more numerous than those based
on action taken by a State."96 For example, in the Russian In-
demnity case, the Permanent Court of Arbitration defined fault
to include "an unlawful act or omission. ' 97 Similarly, in the
Corfu Channel case, Albania was held responsible for its failure
to act because it knew or should have known of the illegal con-
duct involved. 98 The International Court ofJustice (the "ICJ")
held that "it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the
control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that
that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any
unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily
knew, or should have known, the authors." 99 However, once
the evidence established that Albania knew or should have
known of the illegal minelaying, its failure to act made the con-
duct imputable to it.' ° °
94. For example, in 1927, the Institute of International Law stated that "the
State is responsible for injuries caused to foreigners by any action or omission con-
trary to its international obligations." State Responsibility, [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 173, Annex 8, art. 1, at 227, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/(ser. A)/1956/ and Add. l/
(1956).
95. A state's legislative omissions can be the basis of liability. An early attempt
at drafting an international code of state responsibility for injury to aliens included a
provision that stated: "International responsibility is incurred by a State if damage is
sustained by a foreigner as a result either of the enactment of legislation incompati-
ble with its international obligations or of the non-enactment of legislation necessary
for carrying out those obligations." Responsibility of States for Damage Caused in Their
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, League of Nations Doc. C.351(c) M.
145(c) 1930 V Annex IV, art. 6, at 236. quoted in F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 86,
at 21.
96. R. Ago, Second Report on State Responsibility, [1970] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
177, 188, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233/1970.
97. The Russian Indemnity Case (Russia v. Turk.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 532,
543 (1912).
98. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4, 23 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
99. Id. at 18.
100. Id. at 22-23.
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More recently, U.S. actions or inactions in regard to the
contras 101 gave rise to a Nicaraguan claim "attributing responsi-
bility to the United States for activities of the contras," includ-
ing the killing, wounding, or kidnapping of citizens of Nicara-
gua.10 2 The International Court of Justice had to decide
whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United
States Government was so much one of dependence on the
one side and control on the other that it would be right to
equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the
United States Government, or as acting on behalf of that
Government. 0 3
The ICJ found that "there is no clear evidence of the
United States having actually exercised such a degree of con-
trol in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its
behalf."' °4 The Court took the following view:
United States participation, even if preponderant or deci-
sive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and
equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or
paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its op-
eration, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the evi-
dence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of
attributing to the United States the acts committed by the
contras in the course of their military or paramilitary opera-
tions in Nicaragua. All the forms of United States participa-
tion mentioned above, and even the general control by the
respondent State over a force with a high degree of depen-
dency on it, would not in themselves mean, without further
evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the
perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and hu-
manitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts
could well be committed by members of the contras without
101. Contras is the term used to refer to the counter-revolutionary guerilla forces
fighting the present Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The contras date their
existence from 1979 when the Somoza regime collapsed. For a background discus-
sion of the events leading up to the formation of the contras and subsequent U.S.
support for the contra effort, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.CJ. 4, 20-22, 18-21 (Judgment ofJune 27). See
also T. GILL, LITIGATION STRATEGY AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A CASE STUDY OF
THE NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES DISPUTE 125-40 (1989).
102. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 63-64, 113 (Judgment of June 27).
103. Id. at 62, 109.
104. Id.
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the control of the United States. For this conduct to give
rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in
principle have to be proved that that State had effective con-
trol of the military or paramilitary operations in the course
of which the alleged violations were committed.'0 5
The ICJ therefore found that acts of the contras could not
be imputed to the United States. The only question left for the
court was whether any acts of the United States directly en-
gaged its responsibility.' 0 6 In this regard, it was relevant
whether the United States "was, or must have been, aware at
the relevant time that allegations of breaches of humanitarian
law were being made against the contras."' 0 7 In this context,
the ICJ found the United States responsible for the publication
of the manual on "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War-
fare," which could be seen to encourage violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law.' 08
Section 207 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Re-
lations Law of the United States (the "Restatement") also pro-
vides that a state is responsible for any violation of its obliga-
tions under international law whether these violations result
from action or inaction.0 9 The official comment to section
207 notes that "a state is responsible for injuries caused by...
official failures, such as the failure to provide aliens reasonable
police protection;" °" 0 however, "the state is not responsible
for injuries caused by private persons that result despite such
police protection."'
Similarly, the draft code of the law of state responsibility,
under consideration by the International Law Commission
since 1963, declares that the conduct of private individuals
shall not be considered acts of state." i2 The Draft Code notes,
105. Id. at 64-65, 1 115.
106. Id. at 65, 116.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 129-30, 254-56.
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 91, § 207.
110. Id. comment c.
111. Id. There are specific instances of United States settlement of claims aris-
ing from private or mob violence. In one well known case the United States paid
damages to Italy because of the failure of New Orleans authorities to prevent the
lynching of a group of Italian nationals being held for trial. 6 J. MOORE, supra note
86, § 1026, at 837.
112. State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 107, 111-13, 20, 24,
31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/330 (Part 2).
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however, that the state is responsible for inaction when it fails
to carry out an international obligation to act.' '3
B. Fault
The issue of standard of care necessarily arose when a
state's liability for the safety of foreign nationals was consid-
ered. It similarly arises in the context of human rights protec-
tions. Neither doctrine nor case law has arrived at a definitive
determination of the limits of state responsibility, especially
where the acts of private individuals are concerned. It has
been questioned whether the state is strictly liable for human
rights violations or whether there must be a basis in fault for
attributing the violation to the state." 4
With regard to most international law violations, writers
and tribunals, including the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, have generally adopted the principle of fault. Accord-
ingly, Grotius noted that "[t]he liability of one for the acts of
his servants without fault of his own does not belong to the law
of nations... but to municipal law; and that [is] not a universal
rule."' '"
In practice, it appears that strict liability is generally
avoided and responsibility is not imposed for the acts of pri-
vate persons unless fault on the part of state organs or officials
is established. However,
whenever there is a rule providing for the international re-
sponsibility of the State for certain acts, it is necessary to
ascertain whether such rule, tacitly or expressly, makes its
imputation dependent on the fault or dolus on the part of
the organ, or, on the contrary, points only to the existence
of a fact objectively contrary to international law.' 16
With regard to aliens, a state was and is not held to guar-
antee the safety of an alien, but is responsible for injury when
police protection falls below a minimum standard of reasona-
bleness.' What constitutes reasonable police protection de-
113. Id. at 112, 1 22.
114. See F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 86, at 11.
115. H. GROTIUS, 2 DE JURE BELLI Ac PACS LIBRI TRES 437 (Kelsey trans.
1925).
116. D. ANZILO'rrl, CORso DE DiRrIrro INTERNAZIONALE 443-44 (3d ed. 1928).
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 91, § 207 comment c.
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pends on all the circumstances. Of course, the state is also re-
sponsible for injuries resulting from private violence en-
couraged by government officials. The Honduran cases make
clear that these same obligations of states are assured to all
with regard to human rights guaranteed under the American
Convention." 8
In order for the state to be liable, however, there must be
a harmful act committed by an individual or group. In addi-
tion, it must also be possible to attribute to the state some con-
duct with respect to the act that implies the non-performance
of an international duty. I 9 As early as 1598, Gentili wrote that
[o]ne who knows of a wrong is free from guilt only if he is
not able to prevent it. Therefore the state, which knows be-
cause it has been warned, and which ought to prevent the
misdeeds of its citizens, and through its jurisdiction can pre-
vent them, will be at fault and guilty of a crime if it does not
do so.'
2 0
C. Due Diligence
The duty of states has traditionally been formulated in
terms of the concept of due diligence with regard to the pro-
tection of aliens. The Harvard Law School Draft on State Re-
sponsibility (the "Harvard Draft") 12 ' provides that, where
118. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text. Other human rights instru-
ments impose comparable state obligations. See, e.g., International Covenant on
Political and Civil Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. "Each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all indi-
viduals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant .... Id. art. 2, at 173. "State Parties condemn racial discrimina-
tion and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among
all races .... International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 2, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 216-18.
119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 91, § 207 comment c.
120. 2 A. GENTILI, DEJURE BELLI LIBRi TRES 100 (J. Rolfe trans. 1933). In addi-
tion, Grotius found two aspects of a state's conduct toward private injuries involved
breach of a duty. In the first, the state is aware of an individual's intention to perpe-
trate a wrongful act against a foreign state or sovereign, but fails to take the proper
steps to thwart his designs. See H. GROTIUS, supra note 115, at 523-26. In the second
situation, the state receives an offender and, by refusing either to extradite or to
punish him, assumes complicity in the offense. Id. at 526-29. By such conduct, which
constitutes tacit approval of the offense, the state tends to identify itself with the
offender and this tacit approval gives rise to the responsibility of the state.
121. Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries
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criminal conduct is concerned, "failure to exercise due dili-
gence to afford protection to an alien, by way of preventive or
deterrent measures, against any act wrongfully committed by
any person"'' 2 2 gives rise to state responsibility, as does failure
to exercise due diligence to apprehend and to hold any person
committing such an act.' 23
The due diligence standard establishes that a state is not
responsible for purely private harm. 24 Tribunals also have
made this clear, as, for example, in the Noyes case.' 25 This
claim was brought after Noyes, a U.S. citizen driving through a
village in Panama, was assaulted by participants in a political
gathering that became violent.' 26 Noyes was assisted by a po-
liceman who tried to prevent further violence. In rejecting
Noyes' claim that Panama was responsible for his injuries, the
Commission stated that
[t]he mere fact that an alien has suffered at the hands of
private persons an aggression, which could have been
averted by the presence of a sufficient police force on the
spot, does not make a government liable for damages under
international law. There must be shown special circum-
stances from which the responsibility of the authorities
arises: either their behavior in connection with the particu-
lar occurrence, or a general failure to comply with their
duty to maintain order, to prevent crimes or to ... punish
criminals. 127
Liability for lack of due diligence results from more than
mere negligence on the part of state officials and, of course,
to Aliens [hereinafter Harvard Draft] (L. Sohn & R. Baxter, reporters), reprinted in
F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 86, at 133.
122. Id. art. 13(1), at'234.
123. Id. art. 13(2), at 234-35. Compare id. with Responsibility of States for Damage
Caused in Their Territory to the Person or Party of Foreigners, League of Nations Doc. C.75
M.69 1929 V (1929). The draft of the Preparatory Commission of the Hague Confer-
ence on State Responsibility, provides that
[a] State is responsible for damage suffered by a foreigner as the result of
failure on the part of the executive power to show such diligence in the
protection of foreigners as, having regard to the circumstances and to the
status of the person concerned, could be expected from a civilized State.
Id. at 67.
124. F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 86, at 28.
125. W. A. Noyes Case (Pan.-U.S.), General Claims Commission, 6 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 308 (1933).
126. Id. at 311.
127. Id.
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from wilful conduct. Due diligence consists of the reasonable
measures of prevention that a well-administered government
could be expected to exercise under similar circumstances. In
U.S. tort law terms, "the [danger] reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed."'' 28
It is not lightly assumed that a state is responsible. "In
other words, a State is not responsible unless it displayed, in
the conduct of its organs or officials, patent or manifest negli-
gence in taking the measures which are normally taken in the
particular circumstances to prevent or punish the injurious
acts." ' 29 Thus, a state's responsibility is not engaged by the
private injurious act, but as a consequence of the response of
its authorities to the act.
Tribunals have applied the due diligence standard to a va-
riety of claims. In the Alabama Claims case 30 the arbitral tribu-
nal held that the British Government "failed to use due dili-
gence in the performance of its neutral obligations"'' and
"omitted, notwithstanding the warnings and official represen-
tations made by the diplomatic agents of the United States dur-
ing the construction [of the ship], to take in due time any effec-
tive measures of prevention." 132
In the Iranian Hostage case, 33 the International Court of
Justice held Iran responsible for the acts of the militants who
seized the U.S. Embassy. While the acts were not initially "di-
rectly imputable to the Iranian State,"'' 34 the Iranian Govern-
ment's subsequent approval of the militants' actions made
them So.135 Moreover, Iran's failure "to take appropriate
steps"' 136 to protect the Embassy "by itself constituted a clear
and serious violation"'3 7 of international law.
128. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
129. F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 86, at 27.
130. Alabama Claims (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 1 Malloy 717 (1872), reprinted in C. FEN-
WICK, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 706 (2d ed. 1951).
131. Id. at 719, reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 130, at 708.
132. Id., reprinted in C. FENWICK, supra note 130, at 708.
133. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.CJ. 3 (judgment of May 24).
134. Id. at 29, $ 58.
135. Id. at 35, 74.
136. Id. at 30, 61.
137. Id. at 32, 67.
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D. Arrest and Prosecution
A state's additional obligation operates after an impermis-
sible act has been committed. The state cannot ignore a wrong
even where it has no initial responsibility. It must undertake
all reasonable measures to pursue, arrest, and bring the crimi-
nal to justice. 138 The Harvard Draft provides that
[flailure to exercise due diligence to apprehend, or to hold
after apprehension as required by the laws of the State, a
person who has committed against an alien any act referred
to in paragraph 1 of this Article is wrongful, to the extent
that such conduct deprives that alien or any other alien of
the opportunity to recover damages from the person who
has committed the act.' 39
Neither immediate arrest nor conviction are required. How-
ever, the prosecution, trial, and verdict must follow ordinary
standards of justice.
In the Neer case, 14 the Claims Commissioners held that
international standards obligated governmental authorities to
take affirmative actions to investigate and apprehend a wrong-
doer and that failure to do so would be a breach of a legal duty,
giving rise to international responsibility.'
4
'
E. Rationale
It may prove difficult to draw the line between direct re-
sponsibility for complicity in wrongful acts and failure to exer-
cise due diligence to protect against private violence. It is
sometimes stated that the rationale for imposing liability on a
state for failure to act to prevent or to remedy wrongful private
conduct derives from a sense of the state's complicity in the
wrongful acts. 14
2
138. See generally C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 77-78, (1928).
139. Harvard Draft, supra note 121, art. 13(2), reprinted in F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR,
supra note 86, at 234-35.
140. L.F.H. Neer Case (U.S. v. Mex.) United States and United Mexican States
Claims Commission, Op. of Comm'rs 71 (1927).
141. Id. at 73.
142. Both Velasquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz contain language to this effect. See
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. 35, 72, 177, OEA/ser. L./V./
111.19, doc. 13 (1988); Godinez Cruz Case, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. DECISIONS AND
JUDGMENTS 85, 154, 188 (ser. C) No. 5 (1989).
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In the Janes arbitration, 143 the Commissioners cautioned
against too great a reliance on this factor in explaining why the
Mexican government should be held liable for failing to appre-
hend and punish the killers of a United States national:
At times international awards have held that, if a State
shows serious lack of diligence in apprehending and/or
punishing culprits, its liability is a derivative liability, assum-
ing the character of some kind of complicity with the perpe-
trator himself and rendering the State responsible for the
very consequences of the individual's misdemeanor ....
The reasons upon which such a finding of complicity is usu-
ally based in cases in which a Government could not possi-
bly have prevented the crime, is that the nonpunishment
must be deemed to disclose some kind of approval of what
has occurred, especially so if the Government has permitted
the guilty parties to escape or has remitted the punishment
by granting either pardon or amnesty. A reasoning based
on presumed complicity may have some sound foundaion
in cases of nonprevention where a Government knows of an
intended injurious crime, might have averted it, but for some
reason constituting its liability did not do so. The present
case is different; it is one of nonrepression .... [T]he Gov-
ernment is liable for not having measured up to its duty of
diligently prosecuting and properly punishing the offender
.... Even if the nonpunishment were conceived as some
kind of approval-which in the Commission's view is doubt-
ful-still approving of a crime has never been deemed iden-
tical with being an accomplice to that crime; and even if
non-punishment of a murderer really amounted to complic-
ity in the murder, still it is not permissible to treat this de-
rivative and remote liability not as an attenuate form of re-
sponsibility, but as just as serious as if the Government had
perpetrated the killing with its own hands. 144
Although certain governmental actions will giverise to a
sense of complicity in the private violations that occur, the
Janes Commissioners and the Inter-American Court properly
note that the state's responsibility actually derives from the
breach of independent legal obligations. In the case of the
American Convention, those obligations are articulated in arti-
143. Laura M.B. Janes (U.S. v. Mex.) United States and United Mexican States
Claims Commission, Op. of Comm'rs 108 (1927).
144. Id. at 114-15, 19-20 (emphasis in original).
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cle 1 and applied by the Inter-American Court in the three
Honduran cases. The resulting opinions have led to the con-
vergence of the traditional law of state responsibility for injury
to aliens and the more recently elaborated state obligations to
respect and ensure fundamental human rights, thereby ensur-
ing greater protection for all.
IV. "STA TE ACTION" IN U.S. LAW
The Honduran decisions take on added significance when
compared with U.S. judicial decisions limiting government re-
sponsibility for constitutional violations. The restrictive
framework of national protections is especially revealed in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. "'
Joshua DeShaney was repeatedly subjected to brutal child
abuse by his divorced, custodial father. County workers knew
of the abuse and intervened several times on Joshua's be-
half.14 6 Each time, the county returned Joshua to his father.
Finally, when Joshua was four years old, his father beat him
into a life-threatening coma. 147 Joshua emerged from the
coma so severely brain damaged that he will spend the rest of
his life institutionalized.' 48 Joshua's mother sued under sec-
tion 1983 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act 49 for violation of her
son's fourteenth amendment rights, 5 ° seeking to hold the
145. 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
146. Id. at 1001.
147. Id. at 1002.
148. Id.
149. Id. Section 1983 provides for a civil cause of action for state deprivation of
a constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). In Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that three questions should be an-
swered in presenting a claim under this section: First, was a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty infringed? See id. at 284 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979)). Second, did the state deprive the citizen of the right? See id. Third, did the
state meet due process requirements? See id. n.9 (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 140). Mar-
tinez involved the question of whether state officials could be held liable under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for the death of a private citizen at
the hands of a parolee. The Court affirmed dismissal of the claim on the ground that
the causal connection between the state officials' decision to grant parole and the
murder was too attenuated to establish a "deprivation" for purposes of section 1983.
Id. at 285.
150. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that -[n]o
State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision protects against "unjustified in-
trusions on personal security." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
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county responsible for failing adequately to protect Joshua.' 5'
Both the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the
United States Supreme Court held that the county was not re-
sponsible for Joshua's injuries because the state's omissions
did not amount to "state action. "152 The opinion of the
Supreme Court, however, extends beyond the facts of the case
to discuss expansively when, if ever, the failure of a state or
local government entity or its agents to provide an individual
with adequate protective services violates the individual's due
process rights under the U.S. Constitution. The DeShaney
Court concluded that state responsibility for omissions exists
only when an individual is in actual physical custody of the
government. 53 The state is responsible in such custodial situ-
ations, the Court reasoned, because it has rendered the indi-
vidual unable to provide for his own basic needs, including
physical safety. 1 54
The DeShaney opinion noted that "nothing in the language
of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect
the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by
private actors."'' 55 Rather, the clause is written to limit the
state's power to act, and "not as a guarantee of certain minimal
levels of safety and security."' t5 6 Indeed, "[i]ts purpose was to
protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State
protected them from each other."' 5 7 Because of this, "the Due
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to [pro-
vide] governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary
to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the gov-
151. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1002.
152. DeShaney, 812 F.2d 298, 302-03 (1987), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003-04
(1989). Both section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment require state action. In
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), the Court explicitly stated that the sec-
tion 1983 requirement of constitutional deprivation "under color of law" is identical
to the requirement of "state action" under the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 794
n.7; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 ("[Ilt is clear that in a
§ 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action
'under color of state law' and the 'state action' requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment are identical.").
153. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1005.
154. Id. at 1005-06.
155. Id. at 1003.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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ernment itself may not deprive the individual." ' Therefore,
there being no duty to provide any protective services, "it fol-
lows that the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for
injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide
them."' 59 In general, then, "a State's failure to protect an in-
dividual against private violence simply does not constitute a
violation of the Due Process Clause."'' 60
Liability may be imposed only where there is a special re-
lationship1 6 1 or where existing protective services are selec-
tively denied in violation of the equal protection clause.' 62
The Court rejected the "notion" that knowledge of actual dan-
ger and undertakings to protect, create "special relationships"
thereby imposing affirmative duties.' 63 Even the return of an
individual after temporary custody to a clearly known danger-
such as occured with Joshua-creates no liability, because the
individual is in no worse position than if the state had failed to
act at all. 1 64 As ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted, "the State does
not become the permanent guarantor of an individual's safety
by having once offered him shelter."'' 65 In the end, the Court
dismissed the claim against the state by saying that the most
that can be said of the state actors "is that they stood by and
did nothing." 66
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, did not take issue with the
majority's holding that the due process clause creates no gen-
eral right to basic governmental protection. 167 Instead, he
found sufficient state action to hold the state actors liable,
while questioning whether prior cases establish the existence
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1004.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. n.3.
163. Id. at 1004.
164. Id. at 1006.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1007. The Court noted that statutory duties may be imposed by
states and these could be enforced once enacted. Id. Such duties could als.o arise
upon ratification of the American Convention. See supra notes 64-82 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Inter-American Court's interpretation of affirmative duties of
states parties to prevent and remedy human rights violations and that as a conse-
quence, these duties apply to either omissions of state actors or lack of due dili-
gence).
167. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of a "neat and decisive divide between action and inaction."1 68
More broadly, Justice Brennan would hold that "if a State cuts
off private sources of aid and then refuses aid itself, it cannot
wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction."'' 69
The question is whether the government has engaged in an
arbitrary exercise of power. In this regard, Justice Brennan
stated, "inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as action
[, and] . . . oppression can result when a State undertakes a
vital duty and then ignores it."'' °
Prior case law indicates that there is no affirmative consti-
tutional obligation of the government to provide protective
services. In Turner v. United States,' 7 ' for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied a claim for compensation for damage
caused by mob violence, noting the "lack of a substantive right
to recover the damages resulting from failure of a government
or its officers to keep the peace."' 72 Similarly, in National Board
of Y.M.C.A. v. United States,' 73 the Court denied recovery for
damage done to buildings under protective occupation during
a riot in the Panama Canal Zone. 74 In Bowers v. De Vito, 1 75 the
court stated that there is "no constitutional right to be pro-
tected by the state against . . . criminals or madmen"'' 76 and,
therefore, the failure to provide such protection "is not action-
able under Section 1983."' 17 7
168. Id at 1009.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1012. In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun found that the facts
involved active state intervention, rather than passivity, and therefore gave rise to a
fundamental duty to aid Joshua. Id. (.Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun re-
jected "a sharp and rigid line between action and inaction" calling it "formalistic
reasoning" that has "no place in the interpretation of the broad and stirring clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
171. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
172. Id. at 358.
173. 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
174. Id. at 93.
175. 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
176. Id. at 618.
177. Id.; see Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (en banc) (7th Cir. 1988)
(negligence of fire department dispatcher not to'send rescue squad after telephone
request resulting in the death of woman did not amount to § 1983 violation or due
process deprivation), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989); Ketchum v. County of Ala-
meda, 811 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1987) (§ 1983 action brought by woman raped by an
escaped inmate against county officials on grounds of gross negligence for failure to
maintain security at prison could not be supported since rape did not amount to
"state action"); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st Cir. 1986) (failure of
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A broad reading of these cases shows that the government
will not be held responsible for private violence, whether com-
mitted by individuals, by mobs, or by organized groups. Thus,
if this society were ever to deteriorate into the kind of political
violence that terrorizes many countries throughout the world
with disappearances, summary executions, and torture, the
government would be immune from responsibility unless the
private conduct "ha[d] sufficiently received the imprimatur of
the State so as to make it 'state' action for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment."1 78 In this regard, neither state reg-
ulation, nor mere approval of, nor acquiescence to, the initia-
tives of a private party is sufficient to hold the state responsi-
ble. Instead, it must be shown that "there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action,"1 79 the use
of "coercive power" or "significant encouragement" such that
the action "may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."'8s0
These judicial decisions may be questioned on several
grounds. First, the duties to prevent violence and protect pub-
lic safety seem inherent in the functions of government. The
Declaration of Independence states that "to secure" the
unalienable rights of individuals "Governments are instituted
among Men."'' The U.S. Constitution calls for establishing a
government "to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence ... and secure the Blessings of Liberty"1 2 to
all.
Second, the fourteenth amendment and subsequent civil
rights legislation were enacted to remedy both state and pri-
vate acts of violence. The Civil Rights Act of 187 1, 83 which
included what is now section 1983, "was passed by a Congress
state employees in protecting victim from fatal attack by inmate held not actionable
under § 1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). But see Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988) (although in general there is no constitutional
duty of state officials to protect nmembers of public from crime, a special relationship
may be created where state affirmatively placed the person in position of danger or
undertook duty to protect knowing of specific danger).
178. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982).
179. Id. at 1004 (quotingJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)).
180. Id.
181. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
182. U.S. CONST. preamble.
183. Ku Klux Act § 1, 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1982) (original version at 17 Stat. 13
(1871)).
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that had the [Ku Klux] Klan 'particularly in mind.' 184 As en-
acted, the bill specifically addressed the problem of the private
acts of violence perpetrated by groups like the Ku Klux
Klan.'8 5 A 600-page report to Congress detailed the activities
of the Klan and the inability of the state governments to cope
with it. 86 In language reminiscent of the Honduran decisions,
one senator stated:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whip-
pings and lynchings and banishment have been visited upon
unoffending American citizens, the local administrations
have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the
proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the night that
hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons
could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is
given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are
searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress.'
The Civil Rights Cases, 8' consistently cited as first enunci-
ating the "state action" requirement for establishing a four-
teenth amendment violation, is not inconsistent with this view.
The Court noted that the Constitution guarantees rights
against state aggression and not against the wrongful acts of
individuals "unsupported by State authority in the shape of
laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings."' 89 The
issue is whether the private acts are "sanctioned in some way
by the State"' 90 or done under state authority, or protected by
184. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1960) (quotingJ. RANDALL, THE CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 857 (1937)). Introducing the bill, the House sponsor
stressed that "the United States always has assumed to enforce, as against the States,
and also persons, every one of the provisions of the Constitution." Cong. Globe,
42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 69 (1871). Other parts of the section 1981 legislation
clearly extend beyond "state action" to regulate private conduct or remedy failures
to act on the part of the states. See Ku Klux Act § 6, 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (original ver-
sion of § 1981 at 17 Stat. 15 (1871)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982). Section 3 of
the 1871 Act provided for military action at the command of the President should
massive private lawlessness render state authorities powerless to protect the federal
rights of classes of citizens. See Ku Klux Act § 3, 17 Stat. 14.
185. Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2715-16 (1989).
186. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174 (citing S. REP. No. 1, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1871)).
187. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871).
188. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
189. Id. at 17.
190. Id.
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some shield of state law or authority.' 9 ' No language in the
case limits such sanctioning or protection to affirmative state
conduct; "deliberate indifference" to private violence can
equally shield acts of misconduct.
In Monroe v. Pape,'9 2 the Court acknowledged that the
"main scourge of the evil"' 9 3 sought to be remedied by the
1871 legislation was the Ku Klux Klan, which was free to act
due to the omissions of state authorities either unable or un-
willing to enforce the law.' 9 4 The lack of enforcement of ex-
isting state laws created the problem. The misdeeds of state
officers acting "under color of law" thus seem clearly to in-
clude nonfeasance. Moreover, "[i]t is no answer that the State
has a law which if enforced would give relief.' 9 5
Finally, as the DeShaney dissent pointed out, the constitu-
tional restraints on abuse of state power may be infringed just
as surely from inaction as from action. 196 There is no logical
reason to impose liability for one and not the other. Underly-
ing the Court's decision seems to be a confusion between the
separate issues of duty and standard of care or breach. There
may be valid policy reasons for limiting the liability of states
for actions or omissions based on mere negligence. Indeed, in
situations where the duty to act is clear, the U.S. Supreme
Court has established a standard of deliberate indifference
rather than mere negligence. 9 7 However, this does not obvi-
ate the finding that a duty to act exists. Imposition of affirma-
191. Id.
192. 365 U.S. 167 (1960).
193. Id. at 175.
194. Id. at 175-76; see Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-29 (1968) (discuss-
ing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866). According to the Jones
Court, the 1866 legislation "plainly meant to secure [the right to own and lease prop-
erty] against interference from any source whatever, whether governmental or pri-
vate." Id. at 424.
195. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
196. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998,
1012 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. See City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989) (deliberate indiffer-
ence necessary to establish liability for city's failure to train police officers); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (no liability for mere negligence); Youngberg v. Ro-
meo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (no state liability unless substantial departure from ac-
cepted professional practice); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indif-
ference violates prisoner's rights), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Wood v. Os-
trander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) (deliberate indifference will establish liability
for failing to secure personal security); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs.,
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tive duties inevitably increases governmental power and thus
creates attendant dangers. However, rather than denying all
governmental obligations to restrict private abuses of power,
current restraints on governmental power should be balanced
with a recognized need for public action to restrain significant,
known private abuses of power. Constitutional freedoms can-
not be protected unless one looks at significant governmental
inaction as well as action.
The Court's decision in DeShaney seems to be a dangerous
call to arms issued to the public at large. Its emphasis on self-
help to ensure safety as well as food and shelter can only en-
courage vigilante action and an increasing spiral of violence in
already embattled communities. Implicit in the decision is the
majority's faith that such a spiral cannot, and will not, lead this
society into becoming another Guatemala, Colombia, or Leba-
non, where "the perpetrators of the acts of human rights viola-
tions enjoy complete impunity" 198 and violence "spring[s]
from armed terrorist groups on both the right and the left." 1 99
Because the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
found actual Honduran government participation in the disap-
pearances, the result holding Honduras responsible probably
would not have been different if tested under the U.S. Consti-
tution. However, the Inter-American Court's extensive discus-
sion of liability for failure to prevent or remedy private viola-
tions has no support in U.S. constitutional law as interpreted
by the Court in DeShaney. DeShaney, on the other hand, might
very well have come out differently under the American Con-
vention, with its imposition of affirmative duties on states. At
least there would have been a triable issue of whether the duty
was breached. Similarly, under the traditional law of state re-
sponsibility for injury to aliens, had Joshua been a foreign na-
tional, the United States might have been held responsible to
his state of nationality for the failure of the state to exercise
due diligence to protect him.
649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (deliberate indifference can be inferred from repeated
negligent acts amounting to gross negligence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
198. INTER-AM. C.H.R. REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE RE-
PUBLIC OF GUATEMALA 22, OEA/ser. L./V./II.53, doc. 21 rev. 2, 9 (1981).'
199. Id. 10.
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V. CONCLUSION
Whether correctly decided or not, DeShaney limits the pro-
tections of the U.S. Constitution to human rights violations ac-
tually committed by state agents or omissions resulting in
harm to those in state custody. In contrast to the Honduran
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court finds no responsibility under
the Constitution to prevent or remedy violent infringement of
basic rights committed by private actors. In such .a situation,
the U.S. Supreme Court has invited states to legislate. As an
alternative, however, ratification of the American Convention
would provide national standards of due diligence on the part
of government bodies to ensure as well as respect human
rights. The Honduran cases and DeShaney indicate both the
need for and the value of such protections.
